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Summary
The issue of women’s rights in Iraq has taken on new relevance, following the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the formation of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), and subsequent U.S.-led efforts to reconstruct Iraq. In the past year,
the Bush Administration has stated its interest in ensuring that Iraqi women are
involved in the rebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.  There has been a
widening debate regarding the extent to which the U.S.-led reconstruction efforts
have been able to assist women in Iraq and to incorporate them in plans for a future
government.
In recent months, Iraqis, in general, and Iraqi women, in particular, have
complained of a volatile security situation which has contributed to a deterioration
in their status.  According to some observers, this political uncertainty, coupled with
a rise in popular religious activism, has called into question the future involvement
of Iraqi women in nation building.  At the same time, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) reports that there has been extensive progress
in the reconstruction efforts targeting women’s education and the inclusion of women
in local governance.  Others note that the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)
signed by the Iraqi Governing Council in March 2004 includes many provisions that
advocate women’s rights and their inclusion in a future Iraqi government.
The first section of this report provides an overview of Iraqi women’s situation
under Baathist rule (1968-2003).  The second section discusses the position of
women since the overthrow of the Baathist regime, examining the role of the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A third section highlights some of the U.S.-
led reconstruction efforts targeting women in Iraq.  The fourth section outlines
significant issues affecting current and future U.S. policy on women in Iraq, focusing
on the possible outcomes of a volatile security situation, of indigenous challenges to
women’s rights, such as the rise of Islamic conservatism, and of the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty.  A final section will discuss congressional interest in this topic. This
report will be updated as events warrant.
Related CRS products include CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime
Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report
RS21820, Iraq: June 30, 2004, Transition to Sovereignty, by Kenneth Katzman and
Jennifer Elsea; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; and Iraq Reconstruction and Supplemental Proposal (in
the CRS Foreign Operations Appropriations Briefing Book), by Rhoda Margesson
and Curt Tarnoff. 
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1 “Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq,” United Nations Children’s Fund
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Women in Iraq: 
Background and Issues for U.S. Policy
The issue of women’s rights in Iraq has taken on new relevance, following the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the formation of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), and the subsequent U.S.-led efforts to reconstruct Iraq.  One of the
major questions facing the United States regarding the reconstruction process is the
extent to which the United States can help Iraqi women reintegrate into the political,
educational, and economic spheres after a long period of decline, exacerbated by
three major wars and more than a decade of economic sanctions.  Advancing the
position of women and committing adequate resources to girls’ education have both
been linked, on a global level, to the achievement of efficient and stable
development, particularly in post-conflict regions.  This report will examine the
status of women under Baathist rule. It will also discuss the current status of women
in Iraq as it relates to long-term developments, including the writing of a new
constitution, the incorporation of women in local and national governance, the effect
of religious versus secular forces, the growth of the Iraqi economy, the curbing of
security concerns, and the role of U.S. and international assistance.
Women under Baathist Rule (1968-2003)
Under the relatively secular Baathist regime, which espoused Arab socialism,
women enjoyed certain legal privileges and opportunities that were deemed, by many
observers, to be more progressive than other countries in the Middle East.  In
practice, however, many Iraqi women faced various forms of discrimination and
mistreatment. The following is a discussion of women’s position in Baathist Iraq.
Education and Labor
In the 1970s and 1980s, Iraqi oil wealth financed a massive social sector
expansion, helping build the public services, health, and educational sectors. As part
of its program to improve economic development in the country, the secular Baathist
government made education compulsory for boys and girls, until the age of 16. The
Compulsory Education Law, passed in 1976, allowed for primary school attendance
to become nearly universal by the beginning of the 1990s, when it reached 93%.1
Some scholars argue that in addition to economic motivations, the Baathist regime
supported girls’ education as part of a deliberate policy to weaken tribal influence.
The move challenged the existing kinship structure inherent in Iraqi society, a
structure which looked unfavorably on any public role or political participation by
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women. The regime, according to one source, “made it a policy to end women’s
isolation from the public sphere through education, work, unionization, and women’s
associations.”2
Whether for economic or social reasons, the prominence of Iraqi women in the
workforce during the Baathist years was, at least intermittently, an important policy
objective.  This was especially the case during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s when
female labor was needed in order to fill the economic vacuum created by the large-
scale mobilization of male breadwinners.  The special demands on the Iraqi economy
during the Iran-Iraq war, according to a United Nations report, led to increases in
women’s industrial employment, from 13% in 1987 to 21% in 1993.3 By the same
year, female employees constituted 79% of the services sector, 43.9% of the
professional and technical sectors, and 12.7% in administrative and organizational
posts.4  At the same time, women suffered the consequences of serious political
repression, a characteristic of Iraqi society as a whole during this period.5 Moreover,
despite gains in employment, thousands of widowed women were forced to become
the sole household caretakers and to deal with the brunt of a decade-long war that
imposed an emotional and physical burden on a large sector of the population.
Women and the Government
In 1972, in line with the party’s attempt to consolidate civil institutions under
state control, the Baathists formed the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW),
also known as the “Iraqi Women’s Federation.”6  The GFIW  became the only legally
sanctioned women’s organization in Iraq. Despite the existence of the GFIW as part
of the Baathist state, the participation of Iraqis, in general, and of women, in
particular, within the national political discourse was fairly limited. Some sources
argue that in reality, “men ran the state apparatus and filled most of the senior
management positions as Iraq remained a largely patriarchal society.”7
According to a 2003 conference report on women’s role in post-conflict Iraq,
the GFIW organization was originally conceived to “ensure that regulations regarding
women were complemented by capacity-building and literacy programs, and to
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sponsor educational programs on women’s legal rights.”8  One scholar hypothesizes
that Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) came to support the GFIW, seeing it as a way to
break old familial and tribal allegiances while redirecting them towards a Baathist
and nationalist focus.9  Some estimates indicate that in 1997, 47% of all women in
Iraq belonged to the GFIW.10  Other sources provide a more modest estimate, noting
that in the late 1990s, the GFIW had a reported membership of 1.5 million women,
in 222 branches across Iraq. Analysts maintain that the GFIW became “a strong force
in implementing women’s legal claims to land, assuring them access to education”;
it also promoted women’s rights to marry and divorce and in exchange many women
“supported the [Baath] Party just as their leader wished.”11
Despite these indications, the lack of women’s political involvement in the
highest ranks of the Baathist regime is noted by a 1998 report published by the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  The report also indicates that the
proportion of women in Iraqi’s National Assembly had declined from a high in 1984
of 13.2% to 10.8% in 1990. Moreover, while there were legal provisions
guaranteeing women’s right to run for Iraqi political parties for  local “Popular
Councils,” the report concludes that these guarantees “did not result in equitable
representation in these political institutions.”12
Deterioration of the Social and Economic Situation
 (1990-2003) 
A number of analysts concurs that, for various reasons, the position of women
in Iraqi society rapidly deteriorated following the 1991 Gulf War and the United
Nations-imposed economic sanctions (1990-2003).  Economic, social, and political
restrictions placed extreme strain upon women. While there were no official statistics
published on the rate of illiteracy among women, a trend of decreasing literacy was
being reported by the Iraqi government during the 1990s. In 2000, the United Nations
estimates that adult illiteracy among Iraqi women was approximately 45%, an
increase in illiteracy from a reported 25% in 1987.13  The economic decline was
coupled with a decline in the public education sector. In some cases, young girls were
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required to share in the domestic responsibility and to assist their families by earning
informal wages, thus their school attendance was curbed.14 Women endured other
hardships under the strict political regime of Saddam Hussein; according to a U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet, Hussein’s regime utilized sexual assault and torture
to terrorize dissidents and to elicit confessions from female prisoners.15
It appears that the position of Kurdish women in northern Iraq was somewhat
different during this period. Between 1991 and 2003, the Kurdish region was fairly
autonomous, protected by the no-fly-zone enforced by U.S., French, and British
warplanes.  Some argue that as a result, Kurdish-Iraqi women in a better situation
than their counterparts, allowing them to be involved in the Kurdistan Regional
Government and to form women’s organizations and networks that seek greater
political and public participation of women.16  However, in the more traditional and
tribal parts of Kurdistan, the custom of “honor killings,”as will be discussed shortly,
persisted. One news report indicates that with the recent help of dozens of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), this custom might be gradually eroding in the
Kurdish areas.17
Deterioration of the Legal Situation
The 1970 Iraqi Constitution issued by the Baathist regime declared equal rights
for all Iraqis, regardless of sex, race, language, social origin, or religion. In 1980,
Law No. 55 granted women the right to be nominated to the Iraqi National Assembly.
Labor laws also required equal pay, benefits, and promotions for men and women.
For the most part, the personal status laws in Baathist Iraq were based on the 1959
Code of Personal Status, which drew on various sources including Islamic law,
customary law, and judicial precedence.  Under this Code, polygamy was permitted
only with the consent of the Muslim courts in Iraq. Compulsory marriage was
punishable by law. A wife was entitled to request dissolution of her marriage if her
husband did not “fulfil any lawful condition stipulated in [a] marriage contract.”18
In practice, these laws were often not enforced. After the Iran-Iraq war ended
in 1988, some sources indicate that a man was able to “divorce his wife without
paying compensation, and men were also allowed to marry several wives without
consulting current spouses.”19  In the 1990s, the legal situation of Iraqi women began
to deteriorate further. In 1990, as part of an effort to gain support from Iraq’s tribal
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leaders and religious fundamentalists, Saddam Hussein introduced Article 111 into
the Iraqi penal code.  This law exempted men from punishment for the practice of
“honor killings,” that is if they killed female relatives who had committed perceived
sexual improprieties (even if these women were raped). Some reports suggest that
Hussein also allowed the observance of a strict interpretation of shar’ia law, which
called for the stoning death of women as a form of punishment for adultery.20
Women under Post-Baathist Iraq (2003- )
Background
Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the formation of the Coalition
Provision Authority (CPA), the Bush Administration has stated its interest in
ensuring that Iraqi women are involved in rebuilding and reconstruction efforts in
Iraq. An August 2003 “Fact Sheet” issued by the Department of State indicated that:
The U.S. is committed to helping the Iraqi people transition to a sovereign,
representative form of government that respects human rights, rejects terrorism
and maintains Iraq’s territorial integrity without threatening its neighbors.  We
recognize that the women of Iraq have a critical role to play in the revival of their
country and we strongly support their efforts. They bring skills and knowledge
that will be vital to restoring Iraq to its rightful place in the region and in the
world. The U.S. will engage with Iraqi women to secure and advance the gains
that they have achieved so far.21
From the start of the occupation, the Administration has indicated that the CPA is
working to advance women’s rights in Iraq.22 There has been a widening debate
regarding the extent to which the CPA has been able to assist women in Iraq and to
incorporate them in the reconstruction effort. Initially, the U.S. invasion, according
to some sources, was welcomed by a number of Iraqi women who felt that the U.S.
presence provided them an opportunity to have a greater role in the economic and
political future of the country.23  Since then, many Iraqis, in general, and Iraqi
women, in particular, have been concerned over a volatile security situation which
has contributed to a rapid deterioration in their status. According to some observers,
this political uncertainty, coupled with a rise in popular religious activism, has called
into question the future involvement of Iraqi women in nation building.  Within this
context, the United States has been dealing with conservative religious forces, in an
effort to build local alliances.  Some of these groups, particularly among the Shiite
religious establishment, favor a more restricted role for women within Iraqi society.
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Governance
In July 2003, the CPA, headed by administrator L. Paul Bremer, unveiled the
25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).  Only three members of the IGC were
women and one of them, Akila al-Hashimi, was assassinated in September 2003. She
was replaced by another woman Salama al-Khufaji, who joined the other female
appointees Rajaa Khuzai and Songul Chapouk. Chapouk is an ethnic Turkoman and
a Sunni Muslim, while Khuzai and al-Khufaji are ethnically Arab and Shiite Muslim.
Khuzai is a physician who headed a maternity hospital in the southern city of
Diwaniyah. Al-Khufaji is from the Shiite city of Karbala and was a professor of
dentistry at Baghdad University. Chapouk was a teacher of fine arts in the northern
city of Mosul and had previously worked for women’s causes.
Some observers have argued that Iraqi women have an inadequate presence in
the Iraqi ministries and in the judicial infrastructure.24  In December 2003, Khuzai
and Chapouk enunciated their frustrations with the CPA, writing that “women are
severely underrepresented in the leadership established for the transition”; they
asserted that, “as plans for a new governing structure are developed, the Iraqi
Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority should ensure women
their rightful place at the decision-making table.”25  While this critique seems to
represent a viewpoint among some Iraqis, on news source reports that some Iraqi
women’s activists have also raised concerns that al-Khufaji, Khuzai, and Chapouk -
who were appointed by U.S. officials - do not represent their interests and have little
power to advance women’s causes in Iraq.  One women’s activist was quoted as
saying “They don’t represent us. We don’t know where they came from.”26
This criticism, as some observers have noted, highlights one of the challenges
facing U.S. officials working to include Iraqi women in the governing structure. Prior
to the formation of the IGC and in response to widespread concern over the inclusion
of Iraqi exiles in interim government — concern that stemmed mainly from Iraqis
who had lived under the Saddam Hussein regime — administrator Bremer reportedly
promised that the IGC would include a wide spectrum of Iraqis and would not be
dominated by exiles.27 As a result, one of the problems in appointing local Iraqi
women lay in identifying experienced women, who were not affiliated with the
Baathist regime, to work within the interim government.  As part of its “de-
Baathification” policy,28 the CPA abolished the GFIW, which had been the only
officially recognized organization for women under Baathist rule.  After its collapse,
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some of the GFIW’s top leaders, who had been most closely affiliated with the
Saddam Hussein regime, reportedly fled Iraq out of fear of arrest and (or)
prosecution.  In August 2003, an Iraqi newspaper alleged that Manal Yunus Abd-al-
Razzaq al-Allusi, who was president of the GFIW for several years, had escaped to
Jordan along with her family, in order to avoid arrest by Iraqis.29  This story remains
unconfirmed.
Legal Rights 
On December 29, 2003, the U.S.-appointed IGC passed Resolution 137, which
would have overruled the Iraqi Family Law that has been in effect since 1959.
Resolution 137 would have placed several aspects of family law, including matters
of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, under Islamic law. It was reported that
“Islamists on the committee [IGC] want to ensure that no law can be passed that
contradicts Islamic values. [But] Many women fear that this would reverse the social
and legal freedoms gained during decades of secular rule.”30  Following protests led
by women’s groups and pressure by administrator Bremer, the IGC cancelled this
resolution.
Despite the concern over women’s constitutional rights, there were no Iraqi
women on the nine-member committee drafting the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL), which was signed by the IGC on March 8, 2004.  The TAL, which under the
current plan will serve as Iraq’s interim constitution until October 2005, declares
equal rights for all Iraqis regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, or nationality.  It
considers the Islamic religion as a source, but not the only source, of legislation; also,
no provision in the TAL can violate Islamic principles. The TAL also contains a
provision calling for a targeted goal of 25% representation for women in the
forthcoming transitional National Assembly.31 It is unclear whether this provision
will remain in effect after power is transferred to Iraqi hands.
Critics of the TAL have listed several concerns with provisions dealing with
women’s rights. They suggest that the TAL “offers no explicit guarantee that women
will have equal rights to marry, within marriage, and at its dissolution; It does not
explicitly guarantee women the right to inherit on an equal basis with men; It fails to
guarantee Iraqi women married to non-Iraqis the right to confer citizenship to their
children.”32 Proponents of the TAL point out that in 1990, women constituted less
than 11% of Iraq’s National Assembly, and that the 25% targeted goal would more
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than double this proportion.  They also note that 25% exceeds the number of women
represented in the United States Congress and that the TAL is the only Arabic-
language constitution clearly indicating that “gender-specific language,” that is
language written in the more commonly used Arabic masculine form, “shall apply
equally to male and female.”33
U.S. Programs Targeting Women in Iraq
Funding 
Although figures on total U.S. spending on Iraqi women’s programs are not
available, the Bush Administration has launched some initiatives in the past year
targeting women. In light of increasing violence in Iraq, it is difficult to assess the
extent to which these programs have been sustained.34  While women may benefit
from a range of reconstruction and humanitarian programs, there are a few discrete
programs that address women’s issues directly.
In conference report language (Conf. Rept. 108-337), accompanying the FY2004
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation  (P.L. 108-106, passed in November 2003),
which provides $18.4 billion for Iraqi reconstruction, conferees included $10 million
“to support women’s programs” in Iraq. In February 2004, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that “the United States is giving special
emphasis to helping Iraqi women achieve greater equality and has allocated $27
million for women’s programs.” He added that “Education for women is one of the
highest priorities, and the United States has committed more than $86.8 million to
education projects, with special emphasis on ensuring that girls are registered and
attending school.”35
In March 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a $10 million Iraqi
Women’s Democracy Initiative, intended to “train Iraqi women in the skills and
practices of democratic public life.  Programs will include education for democracy,
leadership and political advocacy workshops, entrepreneurship projects, media
training for women aspiring to careers in journalism, and activities to help
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non-governmental organizations build capacity.”36 The Secretary also announced the
formation of a “U.S.-Iraq Women’s Network” (USIWN). Iraqi women’s issues and
women’s programs have also received an indeterminable amount of funding through
other Iraqi reconstruction funds, targeting women in education, local governance,
healthcare, and civil society.
Overview of Reconstruction Programs
Since April 2003, USAID has implemented a number of programs targeting
women in governance. Some of these initiatives have been managed under the
auspices of the Iraq Local Governance Program (LGP), a program intended to
provide a foundation for Iraq’s transition to democracy.  According to the Research
Triangle Institute (RTI International), which has been contracted to work in this
sector, the LGP has attempted to deal with the obstacles presented by Iraqi culture
to women in governance.  The Iraqi Women in Local Governance Group (IWLGG)
has been established in order to “enhance the political participation of women
through civic education and training and monitoring the progress of female
participation in each local government.”37
The LGP also supports and funds initiatives by local women’s groups to develop
their own NGOs, civil society organizations, and professional associations. A major
component of the project, according to USAID, is to facilitate the participation of
women in city councils. Through this program, USAID has held a number of
workshops for women throughout Iraq, specifically in cities such as Arbil, Hillah,
Karbala, and Baghdad. At these conferences, “international and local participants
discuss issues such as  Islam, democracy, oppression of women, women’s rights and
participation in future elections.”38
USAID has supported accelerated learning programs that are specifically
targeted toward girls’ education.  These programs are intended to provide girls with
life skills and the academic background necessary to return to formal schooling.  A
USAID report discussing reconstruction accomplishments in March 2004, indicates
that USAID has rehabilitated 2,351 schools and trained over 32,000 teachers and
education administrative workers.  The report indicates that these efforts, “have
resulted in children returning to school. Notably, female attendance has surpassed
male attendance, and overall attendance during exam week was 97 percent.”39
In trying to encourage the work of NGOs in Iraq, the CPA has worked with
USAID in order to build the organizational capacity of NGOs targeting women
through training and other assistance programs. Some U.S.-based NGOs have
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conducted workshops for women and worked with Iraqi women’s organizations on
women’s rights awareness and skills training.  For example, Women for Women
International, a U.S.-based NGO, is supporting the development of an NGO
community in Iraq and has partnered with agencies and other groups to develop a
number of women’s centers throughout the country, some of which will provide
leadership workshops as well as vocational skills training.40
Issues for U.S. Policy
The Bush Administration has continued to assert that the position of Iraqi
women has improved following the U.S. toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime.
In a speech on March 12, 2004, President Bush indicated that “every woman in Iraq
is better off because the rape rooms and torture chambers of Saddam Hussein are
forever closed.”41  Nonetheless, a number of concerns has been raised over the past
few months regarding the role of women in a future Iraq and the status of U.S. efforts
targeting women in Iraq.
Security Issues 
There are a number of security concerns affecting not only the involvement of
women in the developing Iraqi political system but also the access of ordinary Iraqi
women to reconstruction programs.  As noted above, IGC member Akila al-Hashimi
was assassinated in September 2003. In late March, 2004, gunmen opened fire on a
convoy carrying Iraq’s female Minister of Public Works Nisreen Berwari, who
escaped unharmed. On March 9, 2004, Fern Holland, a 33-year old lawyer and
former Capitol Hill staffer from Oklahoma, was murdered, along with her deputy
Salwa Ourmashi and coalition press officer Robert Zangas.42  Holland worked with
the CPA, as the  women’s rights coordinator in Shiite-dominated areas within
southern Iraq. Some have speculated that Holland was targeted for her work in
promoting women’s rights.  The lack of security has been cited as a major obstacle
in the progress of reconstruction efforts aimed at advancing women’s rights. With the
escalation of violence in April 2004, it appears that “many large international aid
groups, including most of those with women’s programs, have already withdrawn
international staff because of attacks against aid workers.  Now the few remaining
women’s groups fear they will be next.”43
A delegation of Iraqi women visiting the United States in early March 2004
indicated that progress on women’s rights in Iraq was continuously threatened by a
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precarious security situation and the rise of Islamic factions.44  One analyst recently
wrote that since the start of the occupation, “life has not returned to ‘normal’ in Iraq.
In places where kidnapping occurs frequently, children must be accompanied to
schools and women are escorted to the market and have taken to donning abaya
(body-covering black garments) to ensure greater self-protection.”45  Yanar
Mohammad, the leader of a secular, Iraqi-based women’s rights group called the
Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, reports she has  received several death
threats from Islamist militia groups, who have “threatened to assassinate her and
‘blow up’ activists who work with her.”46
Challenges within Iraq
There are a number of Iraqi cultural beliefs and attitudes that might present
challenges to reconstruction efforts targeting women.  One of the challenges is
related to the extent that Islamic law or shar’iah will play a role in a future Iraqi
government. As discussed above, there are Iraqi groups — some of which are
represented on the U.S.-appointed Governing Council — that are interested in
instituting Islamic courts instead of civil courts to oversee matters related to
marriage, divorce, and inheritance.  These courts would be run by Muslim clerics -
all of whom are male.
According to news sources, some Iraqi women’s groups fear that “individual
religious judges would impose Saudi- or Iranian-style rulings that strip women of
rights they enjoyed under Saddam’s more-secular government.”47  Some analysts are
concerned that the growing religious conservatism within Iraqi society is threatening
women who are liberal, secularist, and non-Muslim or those Muslim women who do
not wish to be ruled by a religious-based law.  There is also concern among Kurdish-
Iraqi women’s groups who feel that the strides made during years of relative
autonomy (1990-2003) could be threatened by the fast-growing conservative
religious tide. Many Iraqi women have complained that they have been forced to
wear a head scarf and reports indicate that in the southern Iraqi city of Basra,
Christian female university students have also been pressured to don head scarves.48
Other Iraqi women’s groups, however, point out that Islamic law is not
inherently against women. A Baghdad-based group called the Islamic Women’s
Movement notes that “Islamic scriptures accord women considerable rights —
inheriting property, for example, or declining an unwanted husband.  They say it’s
the way male authorities interpret those writings that keeps women from exercising
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them,” adding that teaching women their rights under Islam would help end injustices
against them.49
Some recent studies have shown that there is some degree of indigenous
resistance to women’s involvement in governance or to women having equal rights,
particularly in the more traditional and Shiite-dominated region of southern Iraq.
One study of southern Iraq indicated that most Iraqi men and women do not give full
support for women’s civil and political rights, “including freedom to move about in
public and to participate in government.”50  The study mentions that “lack of support
for such rights for women may be related to implementation considerations, such as
inadequate numbers of teachers, employment opportunities, and safety issues, among
others.”51  This may not reflect the opinion of Iraqis towards women in other regions
of Iraq. Women in the northern Kurdish region, as discussed above, have experienced
greater freedom and more opportunities for political involvement in the past several
years.  The attitude of Iraqis towards women in larger urban centers, such as
Baghdad, has yet to be investigated and might also reflect a range of opinions on
women’s rights. 
Threats to Reconstruction Programs 
It is difficult to generalize about the status of the reconstruction programs in
Iraq, because the country’s political and social landscape is diverse.  However, some
assessments of U.S. reconstruction programs have called into question the extent to
which CPA and USAID programs have been effective in improving the lives of Iraqi
women, especially considering the uncertain security situation.  One recent survey
by Christian Aid, a UK and Ireland-based charity, indicated that  poverty in Iraq,
particularly among women and children, has been exacerbated by “insecurity, crime,
economic uncertainty, unemployment, inadequate public services and poor
housing.”52 The survey states that in parts of Baghdad, “children’s education is being
severely disrupted. Almost two-thirds of school-age children in the families surveyed
were not attending school full time. The reasons given included poor standards of
education, dilapidated school buildings and children forced to work to boost family
income.”53  A poll conducted by the Institute for Civil Society Studies, an Iraqi NGO,
indicated that serious security concerns have hindered women’s access to healthcare
facilities.  The problem is especially visible in southern Iraq, in the Shiite-majority
city of Basra, where many women have suffered from the long-term effects of war,
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beginning with the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and are in desperate need of medical
care.54
Some analysts have observed that recent terrorist attacks have focused on
civilian targets, making civilian employees working on the reconstruction effort for
the CPA or NGOs targets for violence or kidnaping.  Despite this trend, according
to USAID and NGOs, several reconstruction programs are still fully operational and
continue to serve the needs of many Iraqis, including women and children. In some
cases, while foreign NGO workers may have left Iraq, the NGO offices themselves
have continued to operate with the help of newly-trained Iraqi staffers.
Women and the Transition to Iraqi Rule
The handover of government to Iraqis has been promised by the Bush
Administration and is scheduled to take place on June 30, 2004.  The
Administration’s plans to handover sovereignty would place strict limits on the new
Iraqi government, “including only partial command over its armed forces and no
authority to enact new laws.”55  In the long run, however, what is of major concern
to proponents of  women’s rights is whether any future Iraqi government would
maintain or enforce those constitutional provisions that support the rights of Iraqi
women.  It appears that the biggest challenge to Iraqi women in the upcoming months
will be seeking to voice their opinions in a future government, when they have
already struggled to gain a voice within a U.S.-appointed government dominated by
men. 
Some regard the exclusion of Iraqi women in the writing of the TAL as a
worrisome sign for the future, raising the question of whether women will be
involved in the writing of a new constitution.  Other questions have been raised about
the enforcement of current and future laws that provide equality for women. Even if
a future Iraqi constitution contains progressive provisions for women’s rights, some
analysts are concerned that, “in fact a number of Arab states actually have similar
constitutional rights.  The problem comes -as is the case in the U.S., Europe and
elsewhere-not so much in the written law as in its implementation.”56  The issue of
preparing Iraqi women for future elections and for helping them attain the targeted
goal of 25% of the seats in a new National Assembly is of immediate relevance, as
is the question of  how women’s rights will be affected if religious conservatives are
given greater voice in a new Iraqi government.  Moreover, some proponents have
argued that in order to ensure that women are well-integrated in the nation-building
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process, their role in  rebuilding the Iraqi economy must be institutionalized through
support for equal access to economic and financial resources.57
Congressional Interest
The issue of women in Iraq has been a focus of congressional interest in the past
year. In May 2003, a bill “expressing the sense of Congress that the United States
should provide assistance for women and women’s organizations in Iraq in order to
strengthen and stabilize the emerging Iraqi democracy” was introduced as
H.Con.Res. 196.  In November 2003, a bill “commending Iraqi women for their
participation in Iraqi government and civil society, encouraging the inclusion of Iraqi
women in the political and economic life of Iraq, and advocating the protection of
Iraqi women’s human rights in the Iraqi Constitution” was introduced as H.Con.Res.
342.  Both bills have been referred to the House Committee on International
Relations. In March 2004, two Members took the initiative to form the Iraqi
Women’s Caucus, with the intension of improving Iraqi women’s lives and
supporting women to gain access to educational and professional opportunities.  In
S. 2144, introduced in February 2004 as the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act
FY2005, includes a section stating the “sense of Congress that the rights of women
in Iraq, including their full participation in government and society, should be
protected following the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004.”

